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1

Abstract

The Primary purpose of this paper is to examine the role and importance of Senior
Senators in the US Senate. Many states rely on Senators to bring in federal spending in the form
of pork. When states lose their Senior Senator and the power they accumulated through increased
tenure, they risk losing certain benefits in terms of pork. We use federal expenditures per dollar
of tax and analyze how it is affected by Seniority in the Senate. Population, Income, and
unemployment rates in each state were controlled for in our regression analysis. It is concluded
that increased tenure significantly increases federal spending to Senators’ states. Though this is
statistically significant, we find the effects of losing a Senior Senator to be insignificant in the
overall welfare of a state.
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Introduction

United States Senator Daniel Inouye, from Hawaii, was re-elected to his ninth term in
Congress on November 2, 2010. He is currently the most senior member in the Senate, and
Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. For centuries, he has brought
billions of dollars into the State of Hawaii through earmark distribution and pork barrel
spending. The term “pork” with reference to Congress was popularized Chester Collins Maxey
in an article in the National Municipal Review in 1919. “Pork” refers to government spending
that is set aside for local projects, in order to bring money to a Representative’s District. In fiscal
year 2009, members of Congress spent nearly $20 billion on pork-barrel projects. In fiscal year
2009, Hawaii received over $19,000 in Federal Government expenditure per capita. California,
in that same year, received only $9,360 per capita. Why is it that a state with a resident
population of 1,295,178 received more than twice the amount of money than a state with a
population of 36,961,644? California’s Senior Senator, Dianne Feinstein, is the 25th most senior
member in the US Senate. What role does seniority play in the distribution of federal funds?
The “Culture of Spending” Hypothesis, presented by James Payne (1991) argues that
Congressmen are more likely to support federal spending the longer they have been in office. If
this is the case, what happens to a state when their Senior Senator retires or dies? Hawaii, a state
that is dependent on federal spending to operate, relies on Inouye to bring in pork. At 86 years
old, it is not certain that he will live to see the end of his ninth term. What will happen to the
Hawaiian economy when it loses its Senior Senator? Does the length of tenure for the Junior
Senator have any impact on the allocation of federal funds? These questions will be answered in
this paper.
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There are many factors that have been argued to increase government spending, other
than seniority alone. Party membership and whether a Senator is member of the majority or not,
can influence the allocation of spending. Democrats and Republicans may have different
motives in the Senate. One may believe that securing earmarks is extremely important, while the
other may find it detrimental to the role and purpose of government. These party differences will
be examined in the analysis. Population size will also be considered as an influence on
government spending. There have been arguments from both sides. Some say smaller populated
states have higher number of earmarks (Atlas 1995; Lee 1998) because Senators from smaller
states are more likely to be reelected if they bring in pork for local projects. Others argue that
more populous states have larger number of earmarks (Lazarus et al, 2008). Population will also
be examined in the analysis.
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Literature Review

Public Policy and distributive politics has for a long time been a central issue in the US
Congress. Seniority in the US Senate plays a major role in determining how federal funds are
distributed among states and regions. Most states rely on pork-barrel projects to thrive. The
process in which these funds are allocated has a lot to do with the seniority of State Senators in
the committee system. Seniors Senators are given more power, by rule, and are able to influence
the allocation of federal funds. For example, the current most Senior Senator is Daniel Inouye
from Hawaii. His long tenure in the Senate contributed to his appointment as the Chairman of
the Appropriations Committee. In order for a pork-barrel project to be added to the
Appropriations bill, it must be approved by this Committee. Inouye has the most power in this
Committee due to his seniority. Seniority in the committee system plays a major role in
determining where pork is allocated. There has been little research in the past regarding
seniority in the Senate and distributive politics. Much of the research deals with unequal Senate
Apportionment and House seniority. The small portion of research regarding Congress tenure
and government spending offers little insight on the differences between Senate and House
influence. Also, many studies regarding variables other than Seniority affecting federal outlays
had been conducted. The relationship between state growth and Senate Seniority has not yet
been analyzed.
Brian E. Roberts, in 1990 at the University of Texas at Austin, analyzed the relationship
between seniority in the US Senate and the distribution of federal benefits. For the purpose of
this study, we will use Roberts’s definition of seniority as, “an ordinal ranking of members of a
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given congressional committee that is based on committee tenure” (1990, p. 33). The longer the
Congressman/woman has served in the Senate, the more seniority s/he will have. Senators with
more experience are indirectly given more power by assuming higher positions in the committee
system. Roberts examined changes in policy as a result of an “exogenous shock to the seniority
system”, specifically the unanticipated death of a Senior Senator. Roberts used the death of
Senator Henry Jackson to analyze the relationship between committee seniority and constituent
benefits. Jackson became Washington’s Senior Senator when Warren Magnuson lost the
election in 1980. Right before his death in 1983, Jackson was appointed as the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Roberts explains that Jackson’s death had
enormous implications for constituent interests in both his State of Washington and the State of
Georgia, which his successor on the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn represented.
Roberts also analyzed the consequence of Jackson’s death on the two Senators campaign
contributors, more evidence that lead to the big question of whether seniority leads to benefits.
Roberts grouped firms that represented Jackson and Nunn’s various constituent interests
into two sets: geographic constituents and resource constituents. By looking at the change in
stock prices of the firms that represented the Senator’s constituents, Roberts was able to
determine if there really was a seniority/benefit relationship. Roberts organized firms into
groups along sectoral lines. Some of these sectors were more closely related to the committees
Jackson chaired. Roberts found that the economic interests in the State of Washington were hit
severely by Jackson’s death compared to Georgia, at a statistically significant level (1990, p. 47).
Data was consistent with Robert’s hypothesis that “committee leaders offer tangible benefits to
their constituent interests”. With the seniority model, Roberts found that Jackson’s death
“resulted in substantial redistributions of wealth to the constituents interests of Sam Nunn”.
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Robert’s research helps point out that there is a huge impact on a state when their Senior Senator
dies, as the share prices of defense contractors fell in Jackson’s State of Washington, as prices
were inversely affected in Nunn’s state of Georgia (1990, p. 52).
Moore and Hibbing (1996) similarly looked at the relationship between Congressional
Tenure and the allocation of federal funds. They looked at both House tenure and Senate tenure
in their analysis. They also analyzed distributive politics at a state level and at a district level.
Does tenure lead to direct allocation of funds to a representative’s state? Does the district that
the Representative is from benefit most? Moore and Hibbing found that each additional year of
tenure for a member of Congress led to a small increase in funds to the district s/he is from.
However, the data was statistically insignificant (1996, p. 140). Different results were found for
the allocation of funds at the state level. They found that for each year a Congressional member
gained a year of tenure, the state would receive an extra $71 per person (1996, p. 142). What
about the difference between house and senate tenure? Moore and Hibbing go further to
examine the difference between the two positions. Their results indicate a significant coefficient
for House tenure and a statistically insignificant coefficient for Senate tenure. However, the data
Moore and Hibbing collected was from 1983-1990. This may be too short a time period. The
seniority system in the Senate may have changed over the last twenty years, so more recent and
extensive data could lead to different results. The returns to Seniority may be different with the
turn of the century. This will be examined in the analysis.
Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt (2008) analyzed the issue concerning pork barrel
politics in the U.S. Congress. Specifically, they look at the differences between the House and
the Senate, and the motivations that lead them to allocate pork in certain ways. Influences that
were examined were members’ electoral vulnerability, committee membership, seniority, and
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party membership. After testing a number of variables that may have led to increased earmarks,
Lazarus and Steigerwalt concluded, among other findings, that seniority does plays a major role
in earmark distribution in both the House and the Senate at a statistically significant level. Their
other findings, which are tangents to our interest in seniority, include a significant coefficient for
Reelection Spillover, indicating there is a positive relationship between dual-requested earmarks
and a Senator’s partner’s reelection. Also, contradictory to previous research (Atlas 1995; Lee
1998) Lazarus et al found a positive and significant relationship between population and
earmarks. They found that more populous states receive more earmarks on average (2008, p.
360) Seniority in the Senate actually had a greater effect on earmark distributions than the
House. They found that a one-standard-deviation increase in Seniority in the Senate led to a
19% increase in earmarks overall. These findings differ from previous research done by Moore
and Hibbing (1996).
Lazarus and Steigerwalt found that majority Democrats in the Senate received almost
90% more earmarks that Republicans. Having a longer timeline allows us to examine the
alterations of the majority party to see which party receives more. Though it is usually the case
that the majority party receives more earmark money than the minority, these statistics were
significantly higher than expected. Also, it brings up the question of whether one party is
systematically better than the other at earmarking and the motives that influence their behaviors
in the Senate.
Steven Levitt and James Poterba (1999) attempted to find a source of the link between
state economic growth and congressional representation. They look at congressional delegation
seniority, committee membership, and political competition as possible factors leading to state
economic growth. Similar to Lazarus and Steigerwalt (2008), they found that states represented
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by very senior Democrats had the highest growth rates. This brings up the possibility of reverse
causality and that maybe prosperous states are eager to reelect their incumbent, leading to longer
tenure. This is only true for very senior Democrats, as middle ranking Democrats and state
growth are negatively correlated (1999, p. 192). There is no statistically significant evidence for
state growth and any ranking Republican representative. Levitt and Poterba (1999) used a basic
regression model to relate state growth rate in per capita personal income and variables for
congressional delegation seniority, congressional committee influence, and state political
competition. The earlier results did not include the second two variables, as they isolated the
seniority variable.
Levitt and Poterba (1999) later found that federal spending and economic growth are not
correlated. Because spending effects were not large enough to generate the growth effects found,
Levitt and Poterba came to the conclusion that federal spending did not seem to be the link that
tied state economic growth and congressional representation. The relationship between spending
and seniority was not as strong as the relationship between growth and seniority.
Cary Atlas et al (1995) examined the unequal per capita representation of Senators in the
US Congress and how this representation affects allocation of government spending across
states. Atlas goes off the assumption that overrepresented states, or states that have a smaller
population, should receive more per capita federal outlays due to greater per capita resources in
the Senate and Senators’ incentive to pursuit local benefits. She believed that Senators will more
likely choose to benefit local projects than national policy-making when his or her constituency
is smaller (1995, p. 624-625). In a state with a smaller population, local benefit-seeking will
help a congressman or woman to get re-elected more than in a state with a large population.
Atlas found in her research that states overrepresented in the Senate receive larger per capita
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federal outlays than large underrepresented States. She also found that if California’s
representation in the Senate was proportionate to its population, it would receive an extra $25
billion in annual federal outlays (1995, p. 627).
Frances Lee (1998) had similar results when looking at the consequences of Senate
Apportionment and the allocation of federal outlays. Lee found using a simple index that there
are 31 overrepresented states (small populations), 14 underrepresented states (larger
populations), and five that are represented fairly relative to their population size (1998, p. 38).
Similar to Atlas et al (1995), Lee argues that Senate apportionment is likely to benefit states with
smaller populations. Lee used a pooled cross-sectional time-series design to demonstrate that
States overrepresented in the Senate tend to receive more per capita federal outlays than more
populous States. These overrepresented States receive more than expected on the basis of need
alone, in 8 out 9 policy areas tested. The areas affected most by Senate apportionment are
community development and transportation (1998, p. 58-59).
Lee (2000) adds to his research and demonstrates consequences in Senate apportionment
when he analyzed Senate Representation and Coalition building in Distributive Politics. Lee
erased the thought that maybe smaller states receive more federal outlays than larger states
because they are in greater need, when he proves that a states need for federal funding
corresponds closely to its population size. A state like California needs much more federal
outlays than a state like Wyoming. However, when it comes to the distribution of funds, smallState Senators will have a much bigger influence than large-state Senators. The allocation of
funds largely reflects small-state Senators’ preferences. Lee goes on to discuss coalition building
and how large-state senators must seek out members to build a coalition in order to direct funds
their way.
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Lee (2004) again builds on his research when he examines Bicameralism and Geographic
Politics. He shifts his area of focus to differentiate between House and Senate’s impact on
distributive politics. Lee finds that the Senate has a much bigger impact on the distribution of
funds than the House. This is in large part due to Senate apportionment. Senators and House
members have different incentives in allocating funds, and Lee finds that the Senate’s
preferences have a much larger impact in distributive politics than House preferences (2004, p.
205).
Herron and Shotts (2006) examine term limits and how they may affect pork spending by
the US Government. Currently in the US Senate, there are no term limits. However, Herron and
Shotts (2006) use a legislative model to show that term limits in Congress would decrease the
amount of pork allocated, as voters would not be able to re-elect representatives who were able
to bring home pork in the past. This assumes and is proven in past literature that voters want
Representatives who bring in federal outlays to their state. Herron and Shotts also prove that
Senior Representatives are more likely to vote for pork-barrel projects than Junior
Representatives (2006, p. 396). The results proving term limits would decrease pork-barreling,
implies that the absence of term limits, or increased tenure leads to increased pork allocation.
Their theoretical model, built for a generic representative body, is not tailored to either US
House or Senate.
Almost no research has been done regarding the relationship between Hawaii State
growth, federal spending, and Senate Representation. A 2001 report from the Department of
Business, Economic, Development, and Tourism, illustrates Hawaii’s dependence on Federal
Government expenditures. From 1990-2000, Federal Expenditures to Hawaii increased by more
than 60 percent. In those same years, these expenditures accounted for up to 12 percent of Gross
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State Product (2001, p. 2). How these federal expenditures were affected by congressional
representation and pork-barreling projects remain untested?
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Data

The data chosen for the present study was used to analyze the effects of Senate Seniority
on the distribution of federal funds to individual states. Data was collected from 1981 to 2005 on
all fifty US States (does not include District of Columbia). Every state Senator, along with their
tenure, from 1981-2005 was collected from the US Senate web-based system. Senators serving
for the first time in 1981 were given a numerical value of “0” for tenure. Each year of added
service increased their numerical value for tenure by “1”. Senators that had served in the Senate
before 1981 were given a numerical value for tenure in 1981 equal to the amount of years
already served (e.g. if a senator was elected in 1979, his/her value for 1981 would be “2”). The
political party of each Senator was also recorded. Senators were given a value “1” if they
belonged to the Republican Party or “2” for the Democrat Party.
The dependent variable “Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax” was used to measure
federal spending per state. Each state sends taxes and receives federal spending from the
government. The amounts for tax and spending are different for each state. The values in
“Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax” were calculated by the amount of funds states receive
per dollar of tax they pay. The average Expenditure Per dollar Tax from 1981-2005 was $1.12
across all 50 states. This data was taken from the Tax Foundation’s web-based system.
The populations for all 50 States from 1981-2005 were taken from the US Census
Bureau. The natural log of population was then calculated for each state and year and tested as a
possible variable that affects spending. The ln (population) was used instead of total population
in order to control for malapportionment, or unequal representation. For example, a population
increase of one million people for a state like Hawaii (pop = 1,275,194 in 2005) is much more
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substantial than a similar increase for a state like California (pop = 36,132,147 in 2005). The
natural log of population controls for malapportionment in state size when testing the
independent variables against federal spending.
Federal unemployment benefits contribute to overall spending by the government, the
dependent variable in this study. These benefits differ for each state and depend on
unemployment rates. Therefore, unemployment rates were obtained from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Without accounting for the unemployment rate, federal unemployment benefits
may be accredited to Senators who come from states with high unemployment rates. Controlling
for these rates avoids the possibility of this problem. The average unemployment rate across all
states from 1981-2005 was 5.9%.
Per Capita State Income was also recorded for each state and year. Federal income taxes,
which are progressive, differ for each state. States that make more on average pay more in taxes
to the government. This affects the dependent variable, “Expenditure per dollar of Federal Tax”,
in our study. Thus, it is important to control for average income level of each state. Data was
collected from the US Census Bureau. Average per capita income for all states from 1981-2005
was $21,119.
The political party of the Senior Senator, denoted “Party Senior”, and the political party
of the Junior Senator, denoted “Party Junior”, were derived for each state and year. Once again,
Senators were given a value “1” if they belonged to the Republican Party or “2” for the
Democrat Party. This variable was used to test whether the political party of the Senior Senator
or Junior Senator was important in amount of federal funds distributed.
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The Political Parties controlling the House, Senate, and White House in each year during
the period of 1981-2005 were recorded. For each variable, another dummy variable was created
and given a value of “1” for each year and state if the political party of the Senior Senator at the
time, matched the political party of the chamber being examined. For example, in 1990 for the
State of Alabama, the Senior Senator was Howell Heflin. The variable “control_S” was given a
value of “1” because both Howell Heflin and the majority party in the Senate were Democratic.
Another variable “WH/H/S_tenure_s” was created for all three chambers that had a numerical
value equal to the tenure of the Senior Senator if “control_WH/H/S” had a value of “1”.
Variable

Observations

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

Tenure Senior

1250

15.36

9.19

0

46

Tenure Junior

1250

6.25

5.86

0

36

Pop (State)

1250

5207

5671.8

418

36132

Ln (pop)

1250

8.07

1.01

6.035

10.495

Income

1250

21.2

7452

7849

48032

Unemployment 1250

5.85

2.05

2.3

17.4

Expenditure per 1250

1.12

0.289

0.57

2.33

dollar Tax
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Data Analysis

In order to see the affects of controlling for specific variables, a simple regression was
initially ran between tenure of the Senior Senator (Tenure Senior) and Junior Senator (Tenure
Junior) on the federal expenditures per dollar of tax (Expenditure per dollar of Tax). The
regression was the most basic of regressions as it did not control for any of the factors that were
considered to invalidate the results.
The party of the Senior (Party Senior) and party of the Junior (Party Junior) were added
to the tenure of the senior and junior for the next regression. The regression was ran to see
examine the change in the Expenditure per dollar of Tax if the party of the senior or junior senior
changed from a value of “1” (Republican) to “2” (Democrat). However, this regression did not
control for population size and malapportionment. The effects of political party on Expenditure
per dollar of Tax may be the result of the unequal representation of people’s political affiliation
across the United States. In order to control for this problem, the natural log of population
(ln_pop) was added to the next regression. This leads to a more accurate outcome for the effects
of political affiliation on federal expenditure per dollar of tax.
Unemployment rates and state income per capita were the next two variables added to the
regression. Unemployment benefits contribute to federal spending receipts, along with income
tax that varies across different US States. Controlling for these two variables leads to more
accurate results. Richer states that pay more in taxes have a smaller Expenditure per dollar of
Tax on average, which would be expected given income taxes directly affect Expenditure per
dollar of Tax. Also states that have high unemployment rates receive more in unemployment
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benefits. These skewed statistics will not cause errors in the regression analysis, as they are
controlled for.
Lastly, in three separate regressions, “control_WH/S/H” and “WH/S/H_tenure_s” were
added and examined. These variables were added to see how Expenditure per dollar of Tax
changed if a senior senator’s, whose political party was the same as the chamber being analyzed
for the specified state and year, tenure increased by one year. All three chambers: Senate,
House, and White House were examined and regressed. These results tell us which chamber and
senator political affiliation combination leads to higher federal spending per dollar tax.
Fixed state effects were also controlled for in each regression. The fact that Hawaii
receives more in defense spending than other states on average due to their location, should not
affect differences in overall returns to states. Fixed effects were controlled, and therefore one
more possible obstruction in obtaining accurate results was removed.

17

Results

After running a simple regression between the tenures and political affiliations of the
senior and junior senators on the amount of federal spending per dollar of state taxes, I found
three of the four variables, Tenure Senior, Party Senior, and Party Junior, to be statistically
significant at the 99th percentile. Without controlling for any of the other variables, I found that
increasing the tenure of the Senior Senator by one year, increased Expenditure per dollar of Tax
by $0.003. Increasing the value of Party Senior from “1” to “2”, meaning a change from the
Republican Party to the Democratic Party, causes Expenditure per dollar of Tax decrease of
nearly $.06. As for Party Junior, the same change leads to a $0.03 decrease in Expenditure per
dollar of Tax. This is interesting as the results imply that Republicans are better at pulling in
pork than Democrats. However, this regression did not control for malapportionment or any
other factors that may lead to inaccurate results.
Running a regression controlling for all of our variables, we find different results. The
second Regression in Table 1 shows us that Tenure Junior, along with the other three variables
examined in the initial regression, are all statistically significant at least at the 90th percentile.
Tenure Junior is particularly interesting, as it is negative and significant. This implies that
increasing the tenure of the junior senator actually decreases the amount of Expenditure per
dollar of Tax. In this case, it is more beneficial for a state to have a Senior Senator with ten
years tenure and a Junior Senator with two years tenure, than a Senior Senator with ten years
tenure and a Junior Senator with nine year of tenure. It is hard to explain why a larger gap in
regards to tenure between a Senior and Junior Senator leads to higher federal spending among
individual states. It is easy to understand why increased tenure of the Senior Senator leads to
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higher spending, as more Seniority means more power in the Senate, but the negative
relationship between tenure of the Junior Senator and Expenditure per dollar of Tax is a bit more
confusing. It is possible that higher combined power, in terms of tenure, for two State Senators
is bad when forming coalitions while trying to advocate for pork-projects. Two very
experienced Senators may mean too much power in coalition building in the eyes of other
senators. Having a very Senior Senator and an inexperienced Junior Senator may not seem as
threatening in terms of power. Therefore, this combination of state Senators may be better at
coalition building and bringing in pork to home-states.
Another interesting finding in the regression was the Unemployment statistic, which was
negative and significant at the 95th percentile. Increasing unemployment rates by 1% causes a
$0.006 drop in Expenditure per dollar of Tax. This is interesting because higher unemployment
rates lead to higher unemployment benefits from the government for a given state. Thus, if rates
go up, Expenditure per dollar of Tax should also go up, controlling for income and population
size. However, the results lead us to believe that a lower unemployment rate equals higher
Expenditure per dollar of Tax for a given state. It is possible that Senators from states with low
unemployment rates are more driven to bring in pork in order to maintain their states high status.
Senators from states with higher unemployment rates may not have the drive to bring money to
their home state and believe that spending should go to a state that deserves it, in terms of hard
work. Though this explanation seems highly fabricated, it represents some sort of justification
for the peculiar results.
Income per capita, similar to the results for Unemployment, was also interesting. Income
per capita was positive and statistically significant at the 99th percentile. Increasing income by
$1000 causes a $0.006 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax. Income is usually tied to taxes.
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States with higher incomes have higher taxes and therefore should have a lower Expenditure per
dollar of Tax. This, however, is not consistent with our findings. The results lead me to another
possible, but unlikely explanation. Higher income and therefore, higher tax rates may give
Senators more incentive to bring back money that was taken from the people (in taxes) in his/her
home state. Pork, in this case, would be positively correlated with income per capita.
More normal findings exist for other variables, in their relationship to Expenditure per
dollar of Tax, such as population size. From the regression, I found ln(population) to be
negative and statistically significant at the 99th percentile. Increasing ln(population) one unit
causes a $0.39 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax. The large increase in Expenditure per
dollar of Tax may seem extreme, but a one unit increases in ln(population) is very large as well.
For example, the average ln(population) from 1981-2005 in Hawaii was 7.04, while the average
for California was only 10.33. States with higher populations on average will usually also
receive less in federal expenditures. This can be explained by the assumption that Senators from
states with lower populations are likely to bring in more pork for local projects, with the
incentive of being re-elected. Senators from larger states, due to the sheer number of people, are
not usually associated with the retrieval of pork. Therefore, acquiring pork may not be as
important for these Senators.
Comparing chamber political affiliations, we find only Control House and H_tenure_s to
be statistically significant (p<0.05). Control House was negative, which means that if the
political party of the Senior Senator goes from being different (denoted “0”) than the affiliation
of the House Majority, to the same (denoted “1”), then there will be a $0.03 decrease in
Expenditure per dollar of Tax. Therefore, it is better for a state if their Senior Senator’s political
affiliation is different than that of the majority if the house. H_tenure_s, on the other hand, was
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positive in its relationship to Expenditure per dollar of Tax. This statistic tells us that if a Senior
Senator’s political affiliation is the same as the House Majority’s political affiliation, then an
increase of one year of tenure causes a $0.002 increase in Expenditure per dollar of Tax. This
finding seems to contradict our findings for Control House. However, a positive H_tenure_s is
only explaining an increase of tenure if political parties are similar, while Control House only
tells us that it is better to have a Senator with a different political affiliation than that of the
House majority.
Another possible explanation for the unanticipated results for Unemployment, Income per
cap, and Party Junior is that there is an endogeneity problem. The econometrics were wrong
because of reverse causality. We know, for example that, that there is a positive relationship
between Income per cap and Expenditure per dollar of tax. However, reversing the cause and
effect variables lead to overestimation of our results. The direction of the bias is hard to solve
unless we use a bivariate model. In a multivariate regression, it is hard to know the direction of
the bias. Increases in Expenditure per dollar Tax are attributed to the accompanying increase in
Income per cap, even though other variables may have affected the results.
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The Effects of given variables on Expenditure per dollar of Tax

VARIABLES

Tenure Senior
Tenure Junior
Party Senior
Party Junior

(1)
(2)
(3)
Expenditure per Expenditure per Expenditure per
dollar of Tax **** dollar of Tax **** dollar of Tax ****
0.00287***
(0.000553)
-0.000966
(0.000778)
-0.0581***
(0.00995)
-0.0269***
(0.00868)

Ln(population)
Unemployment
Income per cap
Control Senate
S_tenure_s
Control House
H_tenure_s

0.00154**
(0.000697)
-0.00142*
(0.000751)
-0.0511***
(0.00983)
-0.0279***
(0.00845)
-0.388***
(0.0461)
-0.00576**
(0.00226)
0.00572***
(0.000774)
-0.000508
(0.0127)
-1.81E-05
(0.000734)
-0.0323**
(0.0143)
0.00169**
(0.000822)

Control White House

1.207***
(0.0214)

4.274***
(0.362)

0.00852
(0.0129)
0.000919
(0.000710)
4.079***
(0.355)

1250
0.053
50

1250
0.132
50

1250
0.138
50

WH_tenure_s
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of stateID

0.00178**
(0.000691)
-0.00153**
(0.000749)
-0.0425***
(0.0103)
-0.0275***
(0.00841)
-0.368***
(0.0451)
-0.00531**
(0.00224)
0.00537***
(0.000760)
-0.00714
(0.0121)
0.000717
(0.000673)

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
**** Federal Expenditure per dollar of State Tax
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Discussion

Ted Stevens, the longest serving Republican Senator in US History from Alaska, lost his
seventh re-election bid in 2008. The loss left Alaska with Republican Lisa Murkowski to replace
Stevens as their Senior Senator. In the 2009 Alaska primary elections, Murkowski illustrated
the importance of Seniority to voters. Unfortunately for Murkowski, the state that had received
billions in federal dollars largely in part to Stevens, did not agree, and voted fellow Republican
Joe Miller to take her place. Steve Haycox, a University of Alaska Anchorage history professor,
said in article, “On the face of it, it puts Alaska in a desperate economic situation because it will
have two junior senators…That's a big, big problem when one-third of our economic base is
federal spending." This is the exact situation that people in Hawaii are anxiously awaiting when
Senator Daniel Inouye eventually loses his seat in the Senate. Nearly fifty years of experience in
the Senate simply cannot be replaced. How much will states like Hawaii and Alaska suffer with
the loss of their Senior Senator? Will it really be a “big, big problem” as Haycox puts it?
It has been concluded in the study that, in terms of federal spending per dollar of tax,
states will be negatively affected by the loss of a Senior Senator. Controlling for the variables
we analyzed, Hawaii will approximately lose ($0.0015 x [48-20]) $0.04 in Expenditure per
dollar Tax if Daniel Inouye (48 years) is replaced by the current Junior Hawaii Senator Daniel
Akaka (20 years). However, they should also gain ($0.0014 x [20-0]) nearly $0.03 with the
decreased tenure of the Junior Senator. Alaska’s change will be even less than Hawaii as
Murkowski only had eight years of tenure under her belt.
The loss of Senate Seniority will not completely sink Hawaii and Alaska’s economy, but
it will definitely have a big impact. Federal spending is obviously a huge reason why states like
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Hawaii and Alaska are able to thrive. In Alaska from 1982 to 2005, Expenditure per dollar Tax
increased 216% from $0.85 to $1.84 and expenditures per capita jumped %280 from $4977 to
$13950. This is in large part due to Stevens and his chairmanship to the Appropriations
Committee in 1998. Steven’s seniority was extremely important for Alaska in terms of his
chairmanship. A similar situation occurred in 1997 when Oregon lost 30 years of Senate
experience and two periods of Appropriation chairmanship with the retirement of Mark Hatfield.
States that lose senior representatives like Hatfield and Stevens are losing years of institutional
knowledge. Senior Senators understand the system; they know who to call, they know how to
get things done quickly, and they know exactly what they need. It is like any industry. When a
company loses a worker with decades of experience, they are losing all the invaluable knowledge
that worker has accumulated over his/her career. This knowledge is very hard to replace and
often times companies or states struggle to move on.
A large part of pork allocation in the Senate deals with forming coalitions. Fortunately
for states like Alaska, the relationships Senators create often last after a Senator has lost his/her
position. For example, Stevens and current Appropriations chairman Daniel Inouye had a great
relationship in the Senate. Inouye often visited Alaska, and understood the challenges they
faced. It is unlikely that Inouye will leave Alaska in the cold, even when Stevens is gone.
Making positive relationships is another key immeasurable quality that Senior Senators possess.
Another reason why state economies will not completely destruct when losing a Senior
Senator is the fact that there is a federal commitment to each and every state. Alaska receives
large amounts of federal spending in environment projects, an area that will be boosted under a
Democratic administration. A state like Hawaii is extremely important as strategic military
center for the US. Daniel Inouye without a doubt plays a key role in the allocating federal
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spending for the military complex in Hawaii, but losing him does not mean the state will lose
money for defense. Hawaii will remain a military center and will continue to receive money for
military purposes, no matter who is the Senior Senator.
Many of the plans that Daniel Inouye has enacted and is currently working on will
continue to benefit the state for many years. This type of “long-tem thinking” is crucial for
Hawaii’s future. Future Hawaii Senators will be able to continue Inouye’s Legacy by carrying
out his plans. I n essence, Inouye will be a contributing factor to Hawaii’s economy long after he
leaves.
While state Senators can play a large role, there are many other factors that go into a
state’s economy. It is almost impossible to forecast the future of that state in terms of Senate
Seniority. Senior Senators, and their committee chairmanship, have a lot to do with the welfare
of their state, and it is hard to replace a Senator with decades of experience. Fortunately, the
effects Senators have on states do not disappear when they retire or lose their seat. States
continue to operate on plans enacted by previous Senators, and are able to thrive with
government support.
As for the future of Hawaii, it will continue to play a monumental role for national
prosperity, with or without Daniel Inouye. As long as future Senators continues to support
positive plans for the people of Hawaii, it will continue to be a paradise for all.
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